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Abstract
A growing body of literature reports evidence of social interaction effects
in survey expectations. In this note, we argue that evidence in favor of social
interaction effects should be treated with caution, or could even be spurious.
Utilizing a parsimonious stochastic model of expectation formation and dy-
namics, we show that the existing sample sizes of survey expectations are
about two orders of magnitude too small to reasonably distinguish between
noise and interaction effects. Moreover, we argue that the problem is com-
pounded by the fact that highly correlated responses among agents might
not be caused by interaction effects at all, but instead by model-consistent
beliefs. Ultimately, these results suggest that existing survey data cannot
facilitate our understanding of the process of expectations formation.
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1 Introduction
Expectations play a central role in economic theory, yet we know rather little about
the actual process of expectation formation. A growing body of literature empha-
sizes the importance of social interactions in the process of expectation formation,
and mostly finds empirical support for interaction effects in reported survey data.
These survey expectations typically consist of several hundred monthly responses
by several hundred agents. Here we consider a generic stochastic model of expecta-
tion dynamics that contains both a social interaction component and an exogenous
signal that represents model-consistent beliefs. The purpose of this note is to show
that it is essentially not possible to disentangle the two effects in survey data, and
that even if social interactions were present, the required sample size to identify
interaction effects is about two orders of magnitude larger than existing sample
sizes. Even if we are willing to make strong assumptions about the structure of
multidimensional responses, existing survey data will probably remain a very frag-
ile source for the identification of interaction effects or model-consistent beliefs.
Modern macroeconomics assumes that agents know the ‘true’ model underlying
the macroeconomic laws of motion, and that their predictions of the future are on
average correct. In their extensive review, Pesaran and Weale (2006) find little if
any evidence that survey expectations are model-consistent in this strong sense,
which is hardly surprising given the complexity of our macroscopic environment.
Weaker forms of macroeconomic rationality acknowledge that agents face model
uncertainty and instead focus on learning (see, e.g., Evans and Honkapohja, 2001;
Milani, 2010), informational rigidities (see, e.g., Mankiw and Reis, 2002; Mankiw
et al., 2004; Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2008), imperfect information (see, e.g.,
Woodford, 2001; Del Negro and Eusepi, 2009), and ‘rational inattention’ (see, e.g.,
Sims, 2003). While details of the forward-looking behavior of agents are crucial
for the qualitative differences among these approaches, neither of them considers
the actual process of expectations formation.
Recent econometric approaches are discussing the existence of heterogeneity in
the updating behavior of forecasters (see, e.g., Clements, 2010), and laboratory
experiments equally indicate heterogeneity in expectations (see, e.g., Hommes,
2010). The focus on heterogeneity intersects with another strand of research that
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emphasizes the importance of social interactions in the process of expectations for-
mation. Empirical work on social interactions has traditionally employed discrete
choice frameworks that allow for social spillovers in agents’ utility (see, e.g., Brock
and Durlauf, 2001), but this approach has been rather static in the sense that
cross-sectional configurations are viewed as self-consistent equilibria. The discrete
choice framework has also been investigated in the context of macroeconomic ex-
pectations formation, for instance by positing that agents choose between forming
extrapolative expectations and (costly) rational expectations (see, e.g., Lines and
Westerhoff, 2010), which can lead to endogenous fluctuations in macroeconomic
variables.
Carroll (2003) suggests an alternative route to social interactions, hypothesiz-
ing that the diffusion of news from professional forecasters to the rest of the public
leads to ‘stickyness’ in aggregate expectations. The diffusion of expectations is
also a defining characteristic in several recent contributions that place greater em-
phasis on social interactions than on individual concepts of rationality in their
study of (survey) expectations. These probabilistic approaches by and large aim
for positive models of expectations formation, but yield mixed results so far. Bow-
den and McDonald (2008) study the diffusion of information in various network
structures and find a trade-off between volatility in aggregate expectations and the
speed at which agents learn the correct state of the world. Secondly, they argue
that certain network structures can lead to information cascades. This would be
consistent with the empirical results of Flieth and Foster (2002), who find that
survey expectations are characterized with protracted periods of inertia punctu-
ated by occasional switches from aggregate optimism to pessimism or vice versa.
They also calibrate a model of ‘interactive expectations’ with multiple probabilis-
tic equilibria from the data, which indicates that social interactions would have
become less important over time. Lux (2009) confirms the empirical quality of
survey expectations, with their pronounced swings in aggregate opinions, but he
claims evidence in favor of strong interaction effects. Since both consider German
survey expectations and utilize similar probabilistic formalizations of the expecta-
tions process, the question why they find conflicting results on the importance of
interaction effects warrants some attention.
The source of the different findings might, at least in part, be due to the de-
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tails of the probabilistic processes that the authors employ to model expectations
formation. Both approaches formalize changes in expectations through transition
probabilities that additively combine an autonomous and an interactive element.
Flieth and Foster (2002) use a three-state model that can only be solved numer-
ically, while Lux (2009) uses a two-state model that exploits well-known results
in Markov chain theory and allows for closed-form solutions not only of the limit-
ing distribution but, in principle, of the entire time evolution of the expectations
process. Yet irrespective of a model’s probabilistic details, we want to argue here
that these differences are likely to originate from size limitations of existing sur-
veys, because even if we knew the details of the interaction mechanism, including
the exact parameterization of the expectations process and the network structure
among agents, we would still not be capable of distinguishing between interaction
effects and essentially random correlations in survey responses, nor would we be
able to distinguish model-consistent beliefs from social interactions.
We place a premium on analytical tractability and thus conduct our investiga-
tion in the probabilistic tradition employed by Lux (2009). A number of results
are known in this parsimonious modeling tradition, including (statistical) equilib-
rium properties for a wide range of model parameters and the time evolution of
the probability density of beliefs. Understanding how the qualitative nature of
the model changes with the parameters permits us to isolate the behavioral de-
tails of the expectations process from the question whether it is feasible to detect
interaction and network effects from existing survey data.
2 Stochastic Model of Expectation Dynamics
The model utilized by Lux (2009) traces back to earlier contributions by Weidlich
and Haag (1983) and Weidlich (2006), and is very similar, both formally and
qualitatively, to the herding model of Kirman (1991, 1993). A prototypical setup
in this tradition considers a population of agents of size N that is divided into two
groups, say, X and Y of sizes n and N − n, respectively. In the context of survey
expectations, the two groups would correspond to agents who have optimistic or
pessimistic beliefs regarding the future state of an economic or financial indicator.
The basic idea is that agents change state (i) because they follow an exogenous
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signal, corresponding for instance to model-consistent beliefs, or (ii) because of
the social interaction with their neighbors, i.e. agents they are communicating
with during a given time period. The transition rate for an agent i to switch from
state X to state Y is
ρi(X → Y ) = ai + λi
∑
j 6=i
DY (i, j), (1)
where ai governs the possibility of self-conversion caused by model-consistent be-
liefs, and the sum captures the influence of the neighbors. The parameter λi
governs the interaction strength between i and its neighbors, indexed by j, while
DY (i, j) is an indicator function serving to count the number of i’s neighbors that
are in state Y ,
DY (i, j) =
{
1 if j is a Y-neighbor of i,
0 otherwise.
Analogously the transition rates in the opposite direction, from a pessimistic to
an optimistic state, are given by
ρi(Y → X) = ai + λi
∑
j 6=i
DX(i, j) . (2)
Defining nY (i,J) =
∑
j 6=iDY (i, j) and nX(i,J) =
∑
j 6=iDX(i, j), where J denotes
particular configurations of the neighbors, and using shorthands pi−i = ρi(X → Y )
and pi+i = ρi(Y → X), equations (1) and (2) can be written more compactly as
pi−i = ai + λinY (i,J), (3)
pi+i = ai + λinX(i,J). (4)
As a consequence of the interactions between neighboring agents, the rates pi±i
still depend on the particular configurations of neighbors J, making it difficult to
handle (3) and (4) analytically, but we can employ a mean-field approximation
in order to simplify the problem from a many-agent system to one with a sum of
agents who are independently acting in an “external field” (see, e.g., Chap. 5 in
Aoki, 1998) created by the opinions of other agents. In other words, we assume
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that individual agents are influenced by the average opinion of their neighbors, and
that their behavioral parameters can be aggregated by averaging over all agents.
On the individual level, the instantaneous probability for agent i to switch
from X to Y is given by (3). When the attitudes of i’s neighbors fluctuate, pi−i
fluctuates around its mean
〈
pi−i
〉
= ai + λi 〈nY (i)〉 , (5)
where the dependence on J gets lost if we assume that inhomogeneities among
the different configurations of neighbors are solely due to the fluctuations. Then
we can replace the number of Y -neighbors around each agent i with the average
number of neighbors that agents are linked to, say, D and 〈nY (i)〉 = DPY , with PY
being the probability that an i-neighbor is in state Y , which we can approximate
with the unconditional fraction (N − n)/N of agents in state Y , yielding
〈
pi−i
〉
= ai + λiD
N − n
N
, (6)
and the quantity
〈
pi−i
〉
becomes independent of the particular configuration of
neighbors. Symmetrically, the expression for agents currently in state Y becomes
〈
pi+i
〉
= ai + λiD
n
N
. (7)
Basically, the mean-field approximation reduces a complex system of heterogeneous
interacting agents to a collection of independent agents who are acting “in the field”
that is created by other agents’ beliefs and their average behavior.
On the aggregate level, we are interested in the probability of observing a single
switch on the system-wide level during some time interval ∆t, hence we have to
sum (7) over all agents in state Y in order to find the aggregate probability that
an agent is switching from state Y to state X during ∆t, assuming that ∆t is
small enough to constrain the switch to a single agent. Summing (7), which is
permissible since the agents are now independent, we obtain
pi+ = (N − n)
(
a+
λD
N
n
)
, (8)
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for a switch from Y to X, and
pi− = n
(
a+
λD
N
(N − n)
)
, (9)
for the reverse switch, where a, b are the mean values of ai, bi averaged over all
agents. It turns out that replacement of behavioral parameters by their ensemble
averages is only sensible if the network structure observes some regularity condi-
tions and if the fraction of agents with strictly positive bi is very large, i.e. as long
as the fraction of isolated nodes in the agent network is very small (see Alfarano
and Milakovic´, 2009, for details). We will return to the implications of this point
in the final scenario of Section 3.
For notational convenience, we set
b ≡ λD/N, (10)
while setting c ≡ λD would recover the original formulation of Kirman’s ant
model.1 The equilibrium concept associated with the generic transition rates (8)
and (9) is a statistical equilibrium outcome: at any time, the state of the system
refers to the concentration of agents in one of the two states. We define the state
of the system through the concentration z = n/N of agents that are in state X.
For large N , the concentration can be treated as a continuous variable. Notice
that none of the possible states of z ∈ [0, 1] is an equilibrium in itself, nor are
there multiple equilibria in the usual economic meaning of the term.
The notion of equilibrium instead refers to a statistical distribution that de-
scribes the proportion of time the system spends in each state. Utilizing the
Fokker-Planck equation, we can show that for large N the equilibrium distribu-
tion of z is a beta distribution (see Alfarano et al., 2008, for details)
pe(z) =
1
B(, )
z−1(1− z)−1, (11)
1It is well-known that the original formulation of the ant model suffers from the problem of
N -dependence (or ‘self-averaging’ in the jargon of Aoki), i.e. the fact that the system converges
to a unimodal equilibrium when the number of agents is enlarged while keeping the number of
neighbors constant.
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where B(, ) = Γ()2/Γ(2) is Euler’s beta function, while the shape parameter of
the distribution is given by
 = a/b = aN/λD. (12)
Since  is a ratio of quantities that depend (i) on the time scale at which the process
operates (1/a and 1/λ), and (ii) on the spatial characteristics of the underlying
network (D and N), the parameter of the equilibrium distribution is a well-defined
dimensionless quantity. If  < 1 the distribution is bimodal, with probability
mass having maxima at z = 0 and z = 1. Conversely, if  > 1 the distribution
is unimodal, and in the “knife-edge” scenario  = 1 the distribution becomes
uniform. The mean value of z, E[z] = 1/2, is independent of , and intuitively
follows from the difference of the transition rates (8) and (9), a(N − 2n), showing
that in equilibrium the system approaches n = N/2.
Notice, nevertheless, that the system exhibits very different characteristics de-
pending on the modality of the distribution. In the bimodal case, the system
spends least of the time around the mean, mostly exhibiting very pronounced
herding in either of the extreme states, while mild fluctuations around the mean
characterize the unimodal case. The bimodal case is apparently in line with the
empirical finding of protracted periods of inertia with sudden switches in aggregate
opinion. Since in that case  < 1 implies b > a, the model would seem to suggest
that social interactions on average carry greater weight than idiosyncratic factors
in the expectations formation of agents. The model can also be extended to ac-
count for asymmetries in the average aggregate state with the following transition
rates
pi+ = (N − n)(a1 + bn) and pi− = n(a2 + b(N − n)), (13)
where the constants a1 and a2 now allow agents to have a ‘bias’ towards either state,
for instance if a1 > a2 they will exhibit more optimistic than pessimistic beliefs
on average. In this case (see Alfarano et al., 2005, for details), the corresponding
equilibrium distribution is the beta distribution
qe(z) =
1
B(1, 2)
z1−1 (1− z)2−1 , (14)
9
Figure 1: Beta distribution for various parameter combinations.
where B(1, 2) = Γ(1)Γ(2)/Γ(1 + 2) is again the beta function, while the shape
parameters are now given by
1 = a1/b and 2 = a2/b. (15)
Figure 1 illustrates the flexibility in the shape of the beta distribution, with
unimodal and bimodal cases similar to the symmetric case (11) in the top panel
(a,b), but also including monotonically increasing or decreasing cases in situations
where agents have a strong idiosyncratic signal in one direction, yet still exhibit a
relatively pronounced herding tendency relative to the other state, i.e. a1/b < 1 <
a2/b or vice versa, as shown in the bottom panel (c,d).
In summary, the model provides quite a generic description of a stochastic ex-
pectations formation process that contains only a few behavioral parameters a1, a2,
and b, yet allows for a large degree of agent heterogeneity. Despite its parsimony,
the model produces a wide range of qualitatively different statistical equilibria,
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including endogenous cycles in expectations caused by herding or imitation, but
also equilibria where the vast majority of agents ‘learns a correct state’ in spite
of being surrounded by noise that is created through the social interaction with
neighboring agents. The qualitative features of the process are also parsimoniously
summarized by the ratios (12) or (15), putting us in a position to isolate behavioral
aspects from the question whether it is feasible to identify the communication or
network structure among agents from survey data.
In the next section we argue that an ‘omniscient modeler’, endowed with per-
fect knowledge of the behavioral parameters and network structure among agents,
would not be able to reliably recover this network structure based merely on the
correlations in survey responses. Perhaps more troubling, if our knowledge is
confined to the time evolution of survey responses, we will not even be able to
reliably detect whether survey correlations originate from social interactions or
model-consistent beliefs.
3 Random Benchmark and Simulation
We start with a thought experiment, putting ourselves in the position of an om-
niscient modeler (OM) who chooses a particular behavioral setup and network
structure for the model in Section 2. Utilizing the individual transition rates (1)
and (2), the OM simulates and records the time evolution of beliefs for all N
agents in the system. Afterwards, the OM presents us with data on the individual
histories of agents’ beliefs (or output for short), from which we have to determine
the network structure among agents based on correlations in the time evolution of
their beliefs.
In actual data on survey expectations, with typically two to three hundred
agents reporting monthly beliefs over roughly two hundred periods, we have no
intrinsic knowledge of the network structure whatsoever. So to make life easier
for us, the OM even informs us of the exact number Di of neighbors for each
agent i = 1, . . . , N . We then compute the Di highest correlations for each agent
from the output and report it back to the OM as our best guess of the network
structure in the output. In return, the OM checks our guesses against the actual
identity of neighbors and reveals the fraction of correctly identified neighbors to
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us. The central question is: how many of the Di neighbors do we expect to guess
correctly by pure chance, i.e. irrespective of the correlation among responses?
This establishes a random benchmark against which we have to judge the success
of correlation-based procedures.2
In order to explain the random benchmark, it is instructive to consider a simple
urn model. Let us draw d (read: Di) colored balls without replacement from an
urn containing a total of N balls, m of which are white (read: the true neighbors
of agent i). The probability of drawing k ≤ m white balls in d draws from a total
of N balls is given by the hypergeometric distribution
P (k) =
(
m
k
)(
N−m
d−k
)(
N
d
) , (16)
where the notation on the right hand side refers to binomial coefficients. In other
words, (16) characterizes the distribution of the number of white balls drawn from
the urn in d extractions. The mean value of the hypergeometric distribution is
E[k] =
dm
N
, (17)
from which we can compute the random benchmark since d = m in our OM setup.3
The standard deviation of the hypergeometric distribution is
σ[k] =
√
dm(N −m)(N − d)
(N − 1)N2 . (18)
To keep our simulations in line with available survey data (for instance from
the ZEW for German ‘financial experts’, or from the FRB Philadelphia for US
‘professional forecasters’), we set the number of agents to N = 250; the available
length of periods for individual agent IDs is on average between one and two
hundred, while the number of questions per survey is typically between thirty and
2Instead of considering the time t correlation, we have conducted the subsequent analysis
with various sums of leads and lags in the autocorrelations of responses, yet the results remain
virtually unchanged.
3Notice that choosing a different number of extractions does not change any of the qualita-
tive features in the following results, yet the approach immediately translates into quantitative
prescriptions for measuring different benchmarks.
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sixty. It will be a sobering experience to recall these figures when we present the
simulation results.
3.1 Simulation setup
Regarding the network structure in our simulations, we consider three proto-typical
setups: random graphs in the Erdo¨s-Renyi tradition, scale-free networks in the
Barabasi-Albert tradition, and regular lattice structures.4 To keep matters sim-
ple, we set the number of neighbors equal to twenty in the lattice, and tune the
parameters of the scale-free and random networks such that we obtain adjacency
matrices with an average number of twenty neighbors as well.5 Given these num-
bers and (17) and (18), it is straightforward to compute that the fraction of cor-
rect answers we would expect purely by chance corresponds to E[k] = 1.6 with
σ[k] = 1.16, or normalized with respect to the number of extractions E[k]/d = 0.08
and σ[k]/d = 0.058.
In the subsequent figures, we use the mean plus one standard deviation, E[k]+
σ[k] = 2.76, to illustrate the statistical significance of the OM experiment. We
can compute the probability of such an event from the cumulative hypergeometric
distribution: since the hypergeometric distribution is defined for positive integer
values of k, we have to consider P (k ≤ 2) = 0.79 and P (k ≤ 3) = 0.94. Hence
the range 0 < E[k] + σ[k] < 3 delivers a rather conservative confidence interval in
accord with the usual econometric standards.
In line with (1), (2) and (13), the OM implements the transition probabilities
φi for each agent i as
φ
(±)
i = ρ
(±)
i ∆t = [a(1,2) + bD
(∓)
i ] ∆t with ∆t = 1/(amax + bN), (19)
where the notation D
(∓)
i refers to the number of i-neighbors that are in the opposite
state, and amax = max{a1, a2}. The choice of ∆t ensures both that 0 < φi ≤ 1
4The review article by Newman (2003) provides the historical background and a comprehen-
sive summary of the many mathematical details of these graphs.
5It turns out that changing the number of neighbors in the OM setup has virtually no influence
on the subsequent results. We chose twenty neighbors because this figure does not appear to
be entirely unrealistic. If anything, the communication with twenty neighbors already takes
considerable time and effort in most professions.
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and that all agents act on the same time scale.
The OM then confronts us with the output of the N time series of agents’
beliefs, from which we compute N(N − 1)/2 correlation coefficients. For every
i, the OM also informs us of the actual number Di of neighbors, and in turn
we extract the Di highest correlation coefficients from the output. Intuitively
assuming that the highest correlation coefficients correspond to the neighbors of
agent i, we construct the adjacency matrix of the agent network and report it to
the OM who compares it with the actual adjacency matrix, and informs us of the
fraction of correctly identified neighbors for each i. To aggregate and visualize the
results for each of the following three scenarios, we average the correctly identified
percentages for each agent over the entire pool of agents.
The following scenarios basically consider in how far we can recover the correct
network structure (i) depending on the length of agent histories and (ii) depending
on the number of simultaneous survey answers per agent, i.e. the volume of survey
coverage. The final scenario (iii) takes up a more fundamental issue and examines
what happens when correlation clusters are caused by model-consistent beliefs in-
stead of social interactions. Put differently, is a correlation-based approach capable
of distinguishing between clusters that are caused by either behavioral extreme?
3.2 Scenario I: Single indicator histories
Suppose when agents answer questions regarding rather distant areas of expertise
(e.g. international equity indices vs bonds vs GDP growth vs inflation etc.), they
utilize different networks to form their expectations. So if we use histories for a
single indicator in the OM experiment, what is the required number of observations
per agent (or sample size for short) that is necessary to discriminate between some
genuine network structure and random noise?
We consider both a bi- and a unimodal setup to control for behavioral biases,
and display summary results under different network structures in Figures 2 and 3.
The figures illustrate that there is little difference between random and scale-free
setups, while it is easier to identify neighbors when they are all arranged in a
regular lattice. Regular networks, however, are the least suitable representation of
observed social networks, which tend to interpolate between random and scale-free
14
Figure 2: Average fraction of correctly identified neighbors vs length of individual
agents’ time series for a single question. We chose a bimodal simulation setup with
parameters ε1 = ε2 = .5 and b = 1, i.e. a strong behavioral component relative to
symmetric exogenous signals in either direction.
structures (see, e.g., Newman, 2003, and the references therein). This is also the
reason why we focus our attention on random graphs in the coming scenarios.
As one would intuitively suspect, the identification of interaction effects is
somewhat facilitated in the bimodal case, i.e. when herding or imitation dominate
the expectations formation process. According to Figures 2 and 3, however, this
aspect has merely second-order effects. Up to a sample size of around one thousand
periods, we are not able to distinguish between noise and network effects if our
knowledge is restricted to the time evolution of univariate histories. Hence this
also implies that we do not have a sufficient number of empirical survey data at our
disposal to reliably identify the social interaction component. Viewed from this
perspective, any cluster we identify based on the cross-correlations of answers is
15
Figure 3: Average fraction of correctly identified neighbors vs length of individual
agents’ time series for a single question. Here we chose a unimodal simulation
setup with parameters ε1 = ε2 = 2 and b = 1, i.e. a relatively strong exogenous
signal compared to the behavioral component.
essentially pure noise. If we consider the confidence interval in Figures 2 and 3, the
first scenario suggests that it is entirely unrealistic to identify even a rudimentary
communication structure unless we increase the frequency of survey responses by
one order of magnitude, i.e. from monthly to roughly twice per week. In addition,
if we are indeed facing irregular network structures, the length of single indicator
histories that is necessary to correctly identify about half the neighbors turns out
to be two orders of magnitude larger than empirical sample sizes.6
16
Figure 4: Increasing the number of questions and averaging over them improves
the identification of interaction effects compared to the previous univariate sce-
nario. The model parameterizations remain the same as before, and we utilize a
random network whose structure remains fixed as well. The underlying univariate
responses have a length of two hundred periods.
3.3 Scenario II: Multiple indicator histories
Can we improve the identification of communication structures if we make the
strong assumption that behavioral parameters in the expectations formation pro-
cess of agents do not change across multiple questions, and that their network
structure remains unchanged as well? And how many questions would be nec-
essary in that case? To tackle this issue, we keep the parameterizations of the
previous scenario and simulate the expectations formation process on a random
network, fixing the length of single question histories to two hundred while suc-
cessively increasing the number of questions. Essentially, this means that the
6Simulation results upon request.
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correlation coefficients are averaged both over agents and over questions. To op-
erationalize this procedure, we fix the parameterization and underlying network
structure of social interactions and run K independent simulations of the model
for two hundred periods. For each single run of length two hundred, we perform
the estimation procedure outlined in the previous scenario, and then average over
the K questions.
The results both for uni- and bimodal setups, along with the random bench-
mark, are displayed in Figure 4 and show that a multivariate correlation-based
procedure performs better than in the previous univariate scenario. As expected,
a bimodal environment with strong interactions again somewhat facilitates the
identification of the network structure, but the more appealing feature of this sce-
nario is that the rate at which we discover actual links is markedly higher than
in the univariate case. On the downside, however, the overall accuracy of the
correlation-based procedure remains low. Keeping in mind that the empirical vol-
ume of survey coverage includes roughly thirty to sixty questions, correlation-based
estimates of the interaction structure are almost not significantly different from
pure noise, and certainly very low to begin with: we recover merely twenty percent
of the actual network structure, and the fraction of correctly identified neighbors
increases very slowly with the number of questions.
3.4 Scenario III: Exogenously switching signal
In both of the preceding scenarios we have assumed that all agents have a strictly
positive interaction parameter, which we conveniently set to b = 1. But what
happens if some agents are not socially interacting at all (b = 0) and instead
form model-consistent beliefs from exogenous signals a1, a2 that we can think of
as transmitting the correct state of the world? In principle, these ‘rational’ agents
should exhibit highly correlated responses over time if the exogenous signal is
sufficiently strong relative to the interaction parameter. If the state of the world
does not change over time, the rational agents will all converge to the correct state,
making it almost trivial to identify them from correlation-based procedures. In
order to maintain an empirically more relevant scenario, we thus assume that the
correct state of the world changes every now and then, i.e. the parameters a1, a2
18
Figure 5: Fraction of correctly identified rational agents who follow a time-varying
exogenous signal that is increasingly biased in either direction (denoted by an
increasing value of amax) vs their interaction strength b. At low values of b, the
identification generally performs very well, while higher values of b might prevent
a reliable detection, depending on the relative value of amax.
are no longer constant but change over time.7
In this scenario, we keep the total number of agents at N = 250 in our sim-
ulations, and the underlying network remains a random graph with an average
degree of twenty neighbors. The values of a˜1 = a˜2 = b˜ = 1 are constant over
time for the majority N˜ = 200 of agents, while a smaller group of fifty ‘rational’
agents exhibits time-varying idiosyncratic coefficients, say a1(t) and a2(t), which
essentially measure the speed at which rational agents learn the true state of the
world. The time-varying coefficients take on values in the set {1, amax}, where
amax = max{a1(t), a2(t)}. Suppose for instance that amax = 10 and that the
7From a mathematical point of view, this would correspond to a so-called switching diffusion
process.
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currently ‘true’ state is such that a1(0) = 1 and a2(0) = 10, i.e. we are in an
optimistic regime today. When the true state changes to pessimism, say in period
τ , the parameters change to a1(τ) = 10 and a2(τ) = 1. As far as the switch-
ing probability in our simulations is concerned, we assume that the probability
to switch is five percent, drawn randomly from a uniform distribution. In other
words, an exogenous switch in the signal occurs on average every twenty months
in our simulations.
The matter in question now concerns the fraction of rational agents that we can
correctly identify if the true state of the world changes over time, as it certainly
does in reality. (Notice that we have to adapt the error band since now d = m =
50.) None the less, we would expect the value of b to also have an influence on
our ability to identify the rational agents: when b increases, the noise generated
through the social interactions with the other agents should make it more difficult
to identify rational agents correctly. On the other hand, when rational agents
are not part of the social network (b = 0), and thus do not take possibly non-
rational opinons into account, it should become easier to correctly identify them
with correlation-based procedures.
Figure 5 plots the fraction of correctly identified rational agents for a given
amax when the interaction parameter b takes on values in [0, 1]. The different plots
in Figure 5 refer to increasing values of amax in the simulations. As expected,
our ability to correctly identify the group of rational agents depends inversely on
their interaction parameter b, possibly approaching the noise level as b approaches
the value common to the other N˜ agents. On the other hand, when b approaches
zero, we are in an increasingly comfortable position regarding the identification of
rational agents. Finally, the faster the signal processing ability amax, the easier it
becomes to correctly identify the group of rational agents, asymptotically reaching
the value of one hundred percent independently of b.
4 Discussion and Conclusions
All computations in the preceding scenarios have been performed under the as-
sumption that the OM informs us of the actual number Di of neighbors for each
agent. Clearly, this is a most unrealistic assumption in the context of empirical
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applications to survey data, where we simply have no way of knowing whether
agents interact socially in the first place, much less to whom they are linked to
in case they do. Viewed from this perspective, our results are if anything overly
optimistic to begin with.
Yet the third scenario delivers maybe the most fatal blow to any hopes that
survey data could settle the question whether interaction effects are present in
the expectations formation process of respondents or not. Our preferred way to
read Figure 5 is that we can achieve any desired accuracy in the identification of
network structure through an appropriate combination of b and a time-varying
exogenous signal amax. The other side of that coin is that we have no way of
distinguishing between interaction effects and model-consistent beliefs, even if we
identify relatively strong patterns in the correlations of a subset of agents.
Ultimately, these results suggest that existing survey data cannot facilitate
our understanding of the process of expectations formation, which is particularly
troubling in light of its central importance for modern macroeconomic theory. To
end on a more constructive note, we would like to point out once more that our
thought experiment presumed that we merely have data on the time evolution
of agents’ beliefs. In order to investigate whether interaction effects are indeed
present in the data, it would be enormously helpful if surveys contained questions
that refer directly to the presence of interaction effects.
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